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Required Periodic Disclosure Under the
Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal
Securities Code
GEORGE J. BENSTON*
The author offers a critique of the disclosure aspects of the
current securities acts and the proposed Federal Securities Code
from an economic perspective. He concludes that the costs of
disclosure may outweigh the benefits, and that decisionmakers
must make a fundamental reevaluation of the rationale upon
which disclosure requirements are based before such a policy is
continued.
A rewriting of the federal securities acts and their attendant
rules is surely a considerable, almost awesome undertaking. Since I
am not a lawyer, I can only begin to appreciate the difficulty that
this effort must have entailed. It seems clear, though, that Professor
Loss and his colleagues deserve the praise they have received.
In the comments that follow, the fact that I am not a lawyer
will be quite evident, for I am concerned with the basic economic
goals of the securities acts. I recognize that the drafting of a code
which will be acceptable to various interest groups, and ultimately
to the Congress, requires compromise. But if the essential goals of
the legislation and its prospects for implementation are not clearly
delineated and understood, the new law may do more harm than
good.
One ought to reexamine the securities laws periodically, per-
haps not every ten years, or even every thirty, but it would be nice
for it to be done every forty-five years. The drafting of the proposed
Code presented such an opportunity. I can understand, somewhat,
the politics of a comprehensive review. It is difficult enough to get
any type of a statute through the securities bar, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Congress and whomever else, without
the additional complication of trying to reexamine just exactly why
the statutes should exist in the first place. I also recognize that
many may believe me naive to ask that we probe into why we have
the securities laws at all and also to inquire into whether this partic-
ular redrafting of them will meet the basic reasons for which the
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statutes were drafted in the first place. Nevertheless, if we accept
the premise that the rationale for securities regulation is to effect
certain economic relationships among people in a beneficial manner
rather than to provide gainful or at least profitable employment for
attorneys and accountants, we ought to examine some of the basic
underlying concepts to see whether regulation improves these rela-
tionships or not.
The proposed Code contains a variety of interesting modifica-
tions of the present securities laws. I would like to discuss many of
them. Given the time restraints, however, I am going to restrict my
comments to questions on which I have done some empirical work,
namely, the disclosure aspects.' Professor Loss has recognized in his
introduction to the proposed Code that, within the traditional phi-
losophy of securities regulation, the disclosure changes are perhaps
the most dramatic.' I cannot speak directly in terms of whether the
modifications are the most dramatic in the sense of the economic
ramifications they will have. In fact, as far as I can foresee, the
major result will be etching into stone the aspect of continuous
disclosure. Companies will register only once and will disclose con-
tinuously to the market.
3
The question, then, that I will address is: "To what extent is
such disclosure a good thing?" In particular, will continuous disclo-
sure meet the objectives for which the federal securities laws were
originally drafted, and are there any viable alternatives to this type
of mandatory disclosure? For while it may be rather easy to question
things, it is much more difficult if someone asks: "Well, what would
you do if anyone ever asked you?" 4
Disclosure of corporate financial accounting data is a central
aspect of the present acts and the proposed Code. The expectation,
therefore, that the mandated publication of accounting data will be
beneficial to society should be carefully examined. If it appears that
there are benefits, the first step is to estimate whether the costs of
the requirements exceed these benefits, and then to determine who
1. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g, 77j (1976); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12-13, 15 U.S.C. § 781-78m (1976). See generally G. BENSTON,
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE USA (1976); Benston, Required Disclo-
sure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am.
ECON. REV. 132 (1973).
2. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE XXV (Mar. 1978 Proposed Official Draft). See also id.
§§ 401-406, 501-515, 601-607.
3. Id. §§ 402-403, 602.
4. I do not expect to be asked, however, as I believe The American Law Institute did
not inquire into the opinions of economists in the drafting of the .proposed Code.
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bears the costs and who receives the benefits. Only then can in-
formed judgments be made as to whether the proposed Code repre-
sents an improvement over the present statutes, or whether the
statutes should be changed in some other ways.
To begin, let us consider the reasons that corporations might
and might not voluntarily disclose financial information. For this
inquiry, two extreme assumptions are made. First, corporate con-
trolling shareholders and managers make decisions about disclosure
that they believe are in the best interests of the shareholders as a
group. Second, the controlling shareholders and managers act to
benefit themselves only. These individuals would, without com-
punction, defraud and mislead other shareholders or anyone else for
that matter.
Controlling shareholders and managers who act in the best in-
terests of the shareholders will want to disclose accounting-based
and other information up to the point where the marginal benefits
to the shareholders exceed or equal the marginal cost of producing
and disseminating the information.' The benefits are considerable,
with three being of prime importance: (1) the cost of producing the
information is less to the corporation than to potential and present
investors; (2) disclosure, audited by independent public accoun-
tants, avoids the cost of the investor's beliefs that corporate re-
sources will be misused; and (3) nonpublication of information is
taken as a signal that the corporation has something to hide.
First, prospective shareholders and creditors, whose funds the
corporation and present shareholders want to attract, demand infor-
mation on which to base their investment decisions. The value to
them of investments in the corporation is the present value of the
cash inflows net of outflows that they expect to obtain.' One of these
outflows is expenditures on gathering information designed to deter-
mine the amount of other cash flows. The greater the cost to poten-
tial investors of obtaining information about the corporation, the
less they are willing to offer for a share in the corporation or the
5. "Marginal" in this sense means the incremental cost or benefit of providing one
additional unit of information to the shareholder or potential shareholder. The cost of produc-
ing such information is usually borne initially by the corporation. The information is pro-
duced until the point where the incremental cost exceeds the incremental benefit to share-
holders and potential shareholders. In the absence of market failures, the amount of informa-
tion provided in a competitive market will be at the point where marginal cost and benefit
are equal, a presumably efficient amount. See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 377 & nn.34-
35 (1977); Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POLmCAL ECON. 213, (1961).
6. The arithmetic of present value discounts future returns by an appropriate interest
rate during the period between initial investment and the time when returns are realized. See
J. HIRSHLEIFER, INVESTMENT, INTEREST, AND CAPITAL (1970).
1979]
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higher the interest rate necessary to satisfy them.' Thus, if the cost
to the corporation, that is, to the present shareholders, of providing
information is less than the cost to potential investors of obtaining
this information, the corporation benefits by providing it. The pres-
ent investors also benefit if the cost of having information produced
by the corporation is less than they would be willing to incur indi-
vidually, in aggregate. It is likely that the cost to the corporation of
producing such information is less than the aggregate cost to poten-
tial and present investors since their efforts are likely to be duplica-
tive. Therefore, it benefits the corporation to produce and dissemi-
nate this information to these investors.
Any information that is specific to their firm will be beneficial
to the shareholders of that firm because prospective buyers of the
firm's securities, lenders, or others who are investors in one sense or
another (including employees who are investing their time and their
careers in the firm) will discount the cost to them of gathering
information about the firm that they think is useful. In other words,
if I have a product about which I give information that prospective
buyers want, then that product is more valuable to them. They are
willing to pay me more for it because they do not have to engage in
the expense of learning as much about it. Thus, so long as it is more
efficient for the supplier of the product to disclose and communicate
information about the product than it is for the consumer to obtain
it himself, it is beneficial for the purveyor of the product to disclose,
and for the consumers who will not have to spend their own re-
sources for this purpose.
8
In addition, it is likely to be much less costly to communicate
to people in general, by way of financial statements and publicity
releases and so forth, than to answer questions one by one as indi-
viduals ask them. The empirical work on why people have disclosed
long before they were required to, is very consistent with that hy-
pothesis. Indeed, the fact that companies produced financial state-
ments long before they were required to, and that the extent of such
disclosure increased as the degree of public ownership of' shares
7. All predictive statements made herein should be taken to include the caveat, ceteris
paribus, or all other things unchanged.
8. A good example illustrating the above discussion can be found in the case of brand
name versus generic products. Consumers are often willing to pay more for the name brand
due to assurances of quality that the name conveys. Compare FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S.
637, 645 & n.6 (1966) with id at 649-51 & nn.3-8 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also F. Milne
& R. Watts, Corporate Information: A Public or a Private Good (Aug. 1977) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Rochester).
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increased, is consistent with that hypothesis.'
Second, the owners and managers of corporations can expect
potential investors to be suspicious of the possibility that those in
control will divert the resources of the corporation to themselves."'
Once owners or managers have less than a one hundred percent
interest in corporate resources and profits, they have incentives to
waste, misuse or divert resources when the benefits to them exceed
their share of the reduced profits. Since potential investors have
reason to expect this behavior, they reduce the predicted returns
from their investments to take account of the resources that the
majority shareholders and managers might divert. When those in
control do not intend to divert corporate resources, they must find
some means of convincing potential investors of this fact; otherwise,
they will bear the full cost of the expected diversion.
One way that owners and managers can do this is by installing
a monitoring system of accounting controls that inhibits, if not pre-
vents, both those in control and other employees from misusing
corporate resources. Additionally, the majority shareholders and
managers must convince potential investors that the system is
working and that it will be maintained after the outsiders have
committed their funds to the corporation. Independent certified
public accountants provide this service. Certified public accoun-
tants (C.P.A.s) assure investors that the managers' reports to the
shareholders on the financial condition of the enterprise are pre-
sented in accordance with generally recognized professional ac-
counting standards. The accountants certify that these records have
been audited and that the numbers reported were not manipulated
to cover up serious problems or to mislead investors. As is generally
the case with the production of any good or service, the marginal
cost of the C.P.A.'s work should not exceed the marginal benefits
therefrom." Investors, therefore, would not want C.P.A.s to warrant
that all uncontracted for managerial activities are accounted for.
Certified public accountants can be trusted to perform this
service, not because they are morally superior to others, but because
their "stock-in-trade" is professional integrity and expertise. In gen-
eral, they stand to lose more than it is worth by accepting a bribe
9. See Benston, Accounting Standards in the United States and the United Kingdom:
Their Nature, Causes, and Consequences, 28 VAND. L. REv. 235 (1975).
10. See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL ECONS. 305 (1976); G. Benston, "The Market
for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regulation" (Mar. 1979) (presented to
the Liberty Fund Seminar, Law and Economics Center, University of Miami).
11. See note 5 supra.
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from a client (directly or indirectly in the form of a higher fee for
an engagement), for if accountants should lose their reputations for
integrity, the expected cost is likely to exceed the bribe. It benefits
corporations, therefore, to publish financial statements that are
audited by C.P.A.s."2
Third, any information a corporation discloses or refuses to
disclose is likely to be taken by investors as a signal." Once one
corporation discloses its sales, for example, the failure of other com-
parable corporations to publish sales figures may be viewed by
investors with suspicion. Investors will ask: "What is the corpora-
tion hiding?" To distinguish itself from corporations that have
something to hide, and thus to avoid the discount that investors are
likely to apply to investments in the corporation, a corporation that
has nothing to hide benefits from publishing information. Those
corporations that do not follow suit must suffer the cost of suspicion
generated by nondisclosure or must convince investors that the
numbers either would not be meaningful or that they would be too
expensive to produce. Therefore, a corporation that would prefer not
to disclose some unfavorable or embarrassing information will do
so nevertheless, in order to avoid the belief by investors that the
condition of the corporation is even worse.
Once a corporation begins to disclose and then quits, a signal
is also given. The firm is in effect saying: "Now we are not going to
tell you." That is very suspicious to people reading financial state-
ments. Consequently, once one starts to disclose voluntarily, it is
very hard to give it up, unless the firm has some overwhelming
reason and can communicate it to investors.
Thus, there are very good reasons to expect that promoters,
owners or managers of diffusely owned corporations who are operat-
ing in the interests of the shareholders would disclose everything
that one would want them to, with some exceptions. One problem
that could cause an exception to this general rule is what economists
call an externality.'4 That is to say, there is an advantage from
disclosure that cannot be fully captured by the company making
that disclosure. If Ford Motors tells investors something about it-
self, and the investors are thinking about buying General Motors
12. See Benston, Accountants' Integrity and Financial Reporting, 43 FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVE 10 (1975).
13. See S. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern
Finance Theory and Signalling Theory, in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 172 (1979).
14. Externalities are benefits or costs which are not fully captured or imposed on the
producer or consumer of privately owned goods. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND
PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 248-51 (1969).
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stock, they might like to know how General Motors fits into the
whole milieu of the alternate investments they may want to make.
It would be very difficult to obtain this information if General Mo-
tors does not disclose. The first corporation may not receive the full
benefit of this disclosure unless some other corporation also dis-
closes, if this information is, in fact, useful for making investment
decisions. If it were useful for making investment decisions, then
there is a benefit to all potential investors and corporations if every-
one discloses, which benefit cannot be fully captured by any indi-
vidual firm. This is a limitation of voluntary disclosure, to the ex-
tent that it exists empirically.
Another limitation, possibly, is that the management of the
firm in fact does not know what is good for its own shareholders. If
so, one must ask who knows better. It is possible that the people who
work for the SEC, or who teach accounting in the various universi-
ties, or who write articles, know much more than the corporate
management about how to run corporations and communicate with
shareholders. Almost anything is possible.
Consider, now, a world where controlling shareholders and
managers are dishonest. They would prefer or are willing to misuse
their fiduciary positions and present false and deliberately mislead-
ing financial reports to the public. The relevant questions, I suggest,
are whether disclosure, as mandated by the securities laws, can
prevent them from acting in this manner, and, in any event,
whether such stockholders and managers are likely to be able to
deceive investors. Three issues are considered: (1) the relevance of
accounting data for investment decisions; (2) the usefulness of fi-
nancial statements as a vehicle for defrauding investors; and (3) the
necessity of suborning or not using C.P.A.s to certify the financial
statements.
First, it is important to recognize that no accounting system,
mandatory or voluntary, can provide investors with the economic
information required for their decisions. It is inherently impossible
for accountants to measure economic values objectively where
arm's-length market transactions are absent. This situation affects
most of the items recorded in the records of a corporation since
relatively few operations are completed on a cash transaction basis
within the reporting period of a quarter or a year. The best that the
accounting reports can provide is a subset of the data that investors
might find useful. Even then, the data will be subject to alternative
measurements that, ex post, may appear to have been chosen to
mislead unwary readers. For example, consider a situation where
the sales manager of a corporation believes that a very large order
19791
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for products that have already been produced will be placed a few
days after the end of the business year. If the accountant does not
record revenue or sales until the contract is signed, and the contract
is signed in the next year, the corporation's assets, equity and net
income for the previous year-end and year will have been under-
stated. But if the contract is not signed, the financial statements
will not be incorrect, unless the sales effort of the past year results
in a greater probability that the goods will be sold. In this event the
statements will be incorrect since an asset, "investments in sales
efforts," will not be recorded, and an expense, "sales expenses," of
the previous year will be overstated.
Second, financial statements provide a very inefficient vehicle
for dishonest corporate owners and managers to cheat investors.
Investors, in deciding whether or not to purchase shares or debt in
a corporation, estimate future cash flows. 5 Accounting data neces-
sarily present a history of past activities. It would appear, therefore,
preferable to mislead them by floating rumors, tips, and other os-
tensible "inside" information indicating that the future will not be
like the past. For example, rumors concerning a new process or
product having been developed or oil having been discovered is
likely to be more effective in defrauding investors than the manipu-
lation of accounting data.
Third, those who would use financial statements to defraud or
mislead investors either must suborn the independent public ac-
countants who certify the statements or do without their services.
As discussed above," it is contrary to the self-interests of C.P.A.s
to allow themselves to be bribed, and firing or not using C.P.A.s
represents a signal to investors that the statements may be false or
misleading. Hence, investors would be likely to assume the worst,
which means that they could not be readily defrauded. If investors
are defrauded, it should be recalled that laws other than the securi-
ties acts make this an illegal act, subject to civil and criminal penal-
ties.'
To summarize, there are several factors that motivate control-
ling shareholders and managers of corporations to disclose financial
information that is unbiased and not fraudulent. The corporations
benefit because suspicious investors are likely to pay more for a
share in the corporation than investors who have to find the infor-
15. See E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 87-89 (1972).
16. See p. 1475 supra; note 12 supra.
17. The common law of fraud and deceit in tort are available. See W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 683-736 (4th ed. 1971).
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mation for themselves, and because prospective investors are likely
to assume the worst if there is no disclosure. Independent public
accountants are employed by corporations to certify the published
financial statements to obviate the fears of investors that the dis-
closed numbers will be untrustworthy. In any event, if corporate
insiders want to defraud outsiders, financial statements are not a
preferable vehicle. At best, they are histories of the economic status
and progress of a corporation and, therefore, are not well suited for
making unfounded claims. In addition, the existence of laws that
make fraud illegal works against the use of financial statements
for this purpose since the statements could be used as documentary
evidence of the fraud.
Against these benefits, the corporation must consider the costs
of disclosure."6 The direct costs include the production and dissemi-
nation of the numbers. The indirect costs include the time and
resources required to answer inquiries about the numbers and also
the contingent cost of legal actions should people claim that the
numbers are incorrect and caused them damage. Another type of
indirect costs is action by competitors and others who can use the
information to the detriment of the corporation. It is likely, there-
fore, that as the number of present and potential investors in-
creases, the corporation will find it cost effective to publish audited
financial statements that present general accounting data on stan-
dard forms to a large number of users. The extent to which informa-
tion is disclosed will be based upon a consideration of the benefits
and costs, as outlined above.
It is important to note that this analysis has focused upon only
private benefits and costs. Should there be any externalities,"' the
resulting quantity and quality of disclosure need not be optimal.
One such externality is the use by investors, government and others
of information for purposes other than investing in the disclosing
corporation. As discussed above,2° knowledge of the sales and net
profits of General Motors might be useful to investors who are con-
sidering buying or selling shares in Ford. Before deciding that this
"public good"'" aspect of information is sufficient to require disclo-
sure by corporations, one should first ask whether private services,
18. See Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Dis-
closure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 30, 33-35, 39-41 (1977).
19. See note 14 supra.
20. See pp. 1476-77 supra.
21. Public goods are a class of goods wherein the use of the good or service by one person
does not reduce the amount available to others if the good has been produced. See A. ALCHIAN
& W. ALLEN, supra note 14, at 164-65, 251-53.
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such as Standard and Poor's, Moody's and other securities analysts,
would not provide the relevant data. It is also vital to know whether
the costs of government regulation would exceed the benefits to the
public.
In my opinion, the available empirical evidence supports the
analysis presented above. Before enactment of the periodic disclo-
sure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 the com-
panies whose shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange' :'
published the following financial data in 1926 and 1934 respectively
(expressed as percentages of the total number of companies): bal-
ance sheet, 100% and 100%; current assets and liabilities, 100% and
100%; sales, 54% and 62%; cost of goods sold, 45% and 54%; depre-
ciation, 71% and 93%; net income, 100% and 99.6%. In addition, the
percentage of companies whose statements were audited by C.P.A.s
was 82% in 1926 and 94% in 1934.4 Furthermore, a comparison
between the extent of voluntary disclosure in the United States and
the United Kingdom reveals that, as the number of shareholders
increased, the amount of disclosure, and the formality of the stan-
dards under which it was produced, increased.25 Similar studies of
prospectus disclosure, as now required by the Securities Act of
1933,6 are not available. There is, however, reason to question
whether the disclosure now required provides data that are useful
to investors. As Professor Kripke has observed:
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Securities Act
of 1933 is not operating as it should and that the prospectus has
become a routine, meaningless document which does not serve its
purpose. Trying to keep from going entirely academic on the ivory
shelf by maintaining my contacts with the practicing bar, I have
reached the conclusion that most lawyers agree with me, and
think of the registration process as simply a useless, but lucrative
bit of paperwork. 7
There is very little evidence that financial statements were pre-
pared fraudulently before enactment of the securities acts. " The
22. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12-13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78m (1976).
23. New York Stock Exchange companies accounted for 70% of the security transactions
of all registered exchanges. See Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, 44 ACCOUNTING REV. 516, 519 (1969).
24. Id.
25. See Benston, supra note 9.
26. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5-7, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g, 77j (1976).
27. Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 631 (1973).
28. See G. BENSTON, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 51-53
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paucity of cases, though, may be due to the rule of privity which
made it very difficult to maintain suits against public accountants. "
Almost no instances of such fraud or even misrepresentation or neg-
ligence are mentioned in the hearings that preceded passage of the
securities acts, however. 3° Furthermore, though the Acts removed
the rule of privity and the requirement that a plaintiff must have
relied upon or even have seen the statements,3' almost no actions
were found (or even brought) against public accountants until the
1960's. If there were a serious problem with fraudulent or misleading
statements, one would have expected that the new laws would have
released a flood of actions. In any event, from such cases in recent
years as Equity Funding,32 Home-Stake Production3 and National
Student Marketing, 3 it seems clear that fraudulent or misleading
financial statements have not been banished from the land.
Nor have the acts eliminated or even reduced losses for inves-
tors. It may be that the securities acts were enacted because inves-
tors had suffered tremendous losses in the crash of 1929 and in the
years of the Great Depression. It seems clear, however, that finan-
cial disclosure had little, if anything, to do with these losses. One
measure of this relationship is the delisting during the depression
of companies whose shares were traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, either because the share prices declined below the mini-
mum amounts or because they were merged into other companies.
In fact, a comparison of corporations that disclosed sales prior to
1934 with corporations that did not disclose sales before 1934
showed that a higher percentage of the disclosing corporations
merged over the periods 1929-34, 1934-37 and 1938-40. Moreover, a
higher percentage of corporations that disclosed sales prior to 1934
had stock traded off the exchange.35
(H. Manne ed. 1969), for a review of the existing evidence.
29. See Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 E. & I. App. 377 (1873); W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at
702-04.
30. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
31. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-
12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771, 77q (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 14, 15
U.S.C. § 78j, 78n (1976). But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (reliance
required for § 10(b) civil damages); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (purchase or sale required to maintain private cause of action for money damages
under rule 10b-5).
32. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
33. Geo. H. McFadden & Bros. v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 295 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Okla.
1968).
34. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
35. See Benston, supra note 1, at 136.
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Nor has the disclosure mandated under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 prevented investors from suffering the losses
experienced during the past several years. The major reason is that
the securities acts have virtually nothing to do with such losses.
These losses are basically a function of underlying economic events
which affect equities of corporations and, therefore, necessarily af-
fect people's investments in these equities. Similarly, when one
looks at the financial statements of Equity Funding, which was a
fraudulent scheme, or at the financial statements of National Stu-
dent Marketing, it is hard to understand why, if disclosure was so
important, people simply did not look at those financial statements
and say: "How could anyone be growing at this rate? How are they
doing it? What is going on here?" One can only surmise that inves-
tors were not looking at the financial statements because they were
aware that the financial statements could not tell them what was
going to happen-which was what they were buying the stock for.
The financial statements are simply not designed for that purpose
and can never be conceptually designed for that purpose. Therefore,
we see enormous reductions in the market prices of blue chip stocks
like Xerox, Kodak and Chrysler without someone claiming that
there is something wrong with their financial statements. The prob-
lem arises from their economic condition. Consequently, one cannot
reasonably expect that financial statements or any other type of
disclosure have very much to do with all of this.
If required disclosure has not been necessary or very useful to
investors, it seems clear that the continuous disclosure proposed by
the Code is not likely to be desirable. The proposed Code, however,
would go even further than this. It would give the SEC even more
rulemaking power.3" As a consequence, even greater costs will be
imposed upon the economy. As is generally the case for active ad-
ministrative agencies, the SEC is likely to use its authority to im-
pose additional disclosure requirements upon corporations, whether
or not the cost of the disclosure exceeds the expected benefits. The
SEC must act in this way because it bears the costs of criticism
when it does not require disclosure of a particular item that, in
retrospect, appears desirable. The details of compensating balance
arrangements for the Penn-Central loans present a case in point.
Since the agency rarely receives praise for relieving corporations of
reporting burdens, 3 its natural tendency is to add new reporting
36. E.g., ALI FEDERAL SECURMES CODE §§ 404, 502(c)(1), 505, 512(b)(3), 602(a)-602(b),
603(d), 604.
37. See Benston, Public (U.S.) Compared to Private (UK.) Regulation of Corporate
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requirements, while not removing even clearly obsolete and ineffec-
tive requirements.
Because I prefer not to end this comment on a negative note, I
make the following suggestions. The Code might copy the Compa-
nies Acts of the United Kingdom38 and require disclosure only of
specified items, such as current assets, sales, cost of goods sold, net
profit, contracts with top officers and directors and salaries and
emoluments paid to them. The rulemaking power of the SEC should
be attenuated, if not entirely eliminated, while the basic disclosure
concept of the acts should be reasserted in the following way. Com-
panies should be allowed to register under a special section that
permits them to file whatever financial statements they wish, in-
cluding no statements at all. All these corporationns need do is
require each of their investors to sign a declaration of informed
consent to the effect that the investors realize that the statements
filed have not been approved or even looked at by the SEC and that
the investors will not sell their shares or bonds to anyone who does
not sign a similar declaration. Corporations and their accountants
would still be subject to suits alleging fraud. The financial state-
ments filed could provide evidence of fraud if it were perpetrated,
although the extent of disclosure would be voluntary. It would be
interesting to observe what and how much would be disclosed and
the effect on investors and on their investments, under a system of
voluntary disclosure.
In conclusion, I would like to see some of the above suggestions
tried. While I have my own presuppositions, I would like to find out
what would happen. I would have also liked to have seen at least
some experimentation in the proposed Code. Now, to say that there
is a section in the Code that states that the Commission can do this,
is not to really expect that they will do this. As Professor Loss
stated,3" it is unreasonable to expect the staff of the SEC to have
the necessary objectivity to reform the law. I also would suggest to
you, with great humility, of course, that the legal profession which
deals with the law may not have that objectivity. It is possible that
economists do not have it either. Still, I believe it would be useful
to go back and look at the underlying rationale of the statutes, even
though to do so may not be politically feasible or desirable. At least
it might be intellectually interesting to question whether this rewrit-
Financial Disclosure, 51 ACCOUNTING REV. 483 (1976).
38. Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38; Companies Act 1967, ch. 81 (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Officer 1972 reprint).
39. See Panel Discussion, Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1519, 1535-36 (1979).
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ing of the original statutes will accomplish some expressed and
clearly specified goal. We should be clear as to what the probable
effect of the Code is likely to be.
Let me end by restating the well deserved praise that Professor
Loss should get from me, and all of the rest of us. He is clearly a
Caesar in this endeavor, and I wish I had the eloquence, perhaps
even more than that of Mark Antony, for while I have not entirely
praised Caesar, neither would I want it thought that I wished to
bury him.
